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FOUNDATIONS OF UNION POWER:
THE COMPLEX PATTERN OF
EMPLOYMENT LAWS
JOHN M. COURT*
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following article is a republication of
a section of apaper which was the winner in 1961 of a $7,500
award offered annually by the Labor Policy Association in
Washington, D. C., for the best graduate-student essay sub-
mitted to it on the topic of power of labor unions. Mr. Court
was a student at the Marshall- Wythe School of Law at William
and Mary when he prepared and submitted his paper, which
has been published in book form by the Association. (The
Problems of Union Power Vol. I Series I, 1961; Labor Policy
Association, 1624 Eye St. N. W., Washington 6, D. C.) The
Committee which selected the award-winning paper for 1961
consisted of three eminent scholars and teachers in this field of
study: Dr. C. L. Stephens of Denison University, Dr. 0. Glenn
Saxon of Ydle University, and Dr. C. F. Phillips of Washington
and Lee University.
The article here published, with special permission of the
Association, is an extract comprising that section of Mr. Court's
book which undertakes to explain the peculiar federal statutory
treatment of the employer-employee relationship. In a subsequens
section of his book Mr. Court proposes (1) that full judicial
power be restored to the judiciary in labor cases with the establish-
ment of Referees in Labor Relations comparable to Referees in
Bankruptcy, (2) that the focus of effort of the National Labor
Relations Board be concentrated on administrative and not
judicial functions, and (3) that the Congress, by a statement of
national policy similar to that in the Employment Act, redefine
the scope of the "Commerce Clause" of the Constitution consistent
with what Mr. Court believes to be its original intent, giving
greater emphasis to local and regional responsibility and authority
in the economy. The author also suggests that the Railway Labor
*B.S., U.S. Naval Academy (1936); M.B.A., George Washington Uni-
versity (1952); B.C.L., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary (1961). Mr. Court is currently practicing law in Newport News,
Virginia.
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Act, which was an antecedent to the existing pattern of labor
legislation, be integrated with other labor statutes.
The book undertakes to evaluate not only the legal aspects of
the problem, but the sociological and economic aspects as well,
and accordingly is aimed at an audience broader than the legal
profession. The section here republished should be of particular
interest to those in the legal profession confronted with labor
problems.
I
One eminent and perceptive observer, the Harvard econo-
mist Sumner Slichter, scanning the American economic scene
fifteen years ago, drew a sharp profile of the American labor
movement, identifying in it these prominent characteristics:a
(a) Tremendous power-big unions are "the most
powerful economic organizations the country has ever
seen."
(b) Professional leadership-the leaders of the move-
ment are full time professionals, "as remote from the rank
and file as are the heads of large corporations."
(c) Concentration of power within each union-"any
competition for office at the national level is ruthlessly
suppressed."
(d) Intense rivalry-rivalry, rather than economic
considerations, guides union policy.
(e) Specialized objectives-the movement is "character-
ized by strong particularisms and by lack of an organiza-
tion which represents labor as a whole."
(f) Failure to recognize the public interest-the trade
union movement has failed to "adjust itself to the in-
creasingly important role of government in determining
conditions of employment."
1aThe Challenge of Industrial Relations, Cornell University Press, 1947, pp
14-18.
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Despite the subsequent nominal merger of the American
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, achieved in 1955, the eventful intervening years have
little changed the character of union power. Legislation enacted
to abate its intemperance and stabilize its growth has tended
primarily to consolidate its position.
Archibald Cox, while a Harvard law professor, testifying
to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1959, said, lb
• . . labor unions enjoy their present power by virtue of
Federal statutes, chiefly the National Labor Relations
Act. Other voluntary associations are different in two
respects: (1) they lack the statutory power of a union
designated as a bargaining representative; (2) no other
voluntary association has as much power over an indivi-
dual's livelihood and opportunities or over the rules
governing his daily life. The union bulks much larger in
the life of a worker than a corporation in the affairs of a
stockholder.
The legal basis of union power is found in the immunities
and privileges which attach by statute to labor union activities.
The significance of these will be lost unless the reader keeps
in mind, in general outline at least, the basic pattern of law
into which these immunities or privileges are set.
By 1776 English common law had digested not only the
old ecclesiastical law but a sort of international code developed
over the centuries as special law for those engaged in com-
merce. Thus the colonies began their independent course
with a cohesive body of judicial precedents comprehending all
civil justice. Each citizen could protect his rights through
the courts of law without aid of new legislation. If the absence
of suitable precedent prevented adjudication at law or if action
were needed in the cause of justice to forestall prospective
rather than to remedy past transgressions, the complainant
could petition the sovereign for special relief through courts
of equity whereupon, on the more abstract basis of "natural
law", the chancery court would determine a just solution in
the circumstances proven and upon an equitable decree or in-
lb See U. S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS
(1959), 2418.
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junction the officers of the court could enforce its determina-
tion. As our own statutory law developed, reliance on prece-
dent and "natural law" declined and the major judicial function
became the interpretation and adaptation of the expressed
legislative will of the sovereign into a myriad of unique and
frequently unanticipated situations. Nevertheless the common
law concept of one code for all citizens and of equality before
the bar of justice carried over into the statutes of the new
government. The Comity Clause in the Articles of Con-
federation became the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution.2 Their intent was to assure that all citizens
enjoyed in the eyes of the law the same privileges and im-
munities. Government would proceed by impersonal law of
general application. The Fifth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights placed on the federal government substantially the same
obligation to recognize the equal status of all citizens in the
legal sense.2 a
Labor law texts often cite a few scattered opinions 3 rendered
in labor disputes in the early days of the federal republic as
evidence of a general bias of the courts in favor of property
owners and against labor. The cases reveal, however, a pattern
of attempted coercion by the labor groups wherever the courts
were assertive.4 The great accomplishment of the common
law had been the substantial elimination of bias or privilege and
of special codes, digesting all into a balanced comprehensive
system of marked stability which was accepted with grateful
respect and keen understanding by the people at large. The
common law back through the Middle Ages is replete with
cases on trade regulation illustrating that the courts persistently
struggled to maintain individual freedom of action. 5 Open or
2 Constitution of the United States, Analysis and Interpretation, U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1953, 686.
2
a The clauses in 2 supra applied only to the States.
3 The favorite citation is some dicta from the Philadelphia Cordwainers
Case (1806) 3 Commons and Gilmore, Documentary History of American
Industrial Society (1910) 59, 233.
4 See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1930, p 3 and notes.
5 See Milton Handler, "Schoolmaster Case," (1410), 12; "Meat Market Case,"
(1433), 13; "Case of the Tailors of Ipswich," (1614), 32; "Case of
Monopolies," (1602), 44; TRADE REGULATION, Foundation Press,
1960.
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covert agreements to interfere with public access to open ex-
change was not only a tort but such combinations in the eight-
eenth century were also penalized by statute law in England, 6
that is, Parliament declared it a punishable misdemeanor to
conspire to effect a monopoly or a restraint of trade. The most
onerous early monopolies were the result of Sovereign grants of
special privilege and first occurred in royal patents. The abuse
of these lead to the sharp curtailment of royal power by Parlia-
ment. 7 Legalized monopolies thereafter took the form of cor-
porations chartered by Parliament with a narrow delegation of
sovereign powers for a specified purpose.
The corporation is a legal concept in which an unlimited
number of persons may pool a part of their resources in a formal
organization recognized at law as an entity separate from its
members and clothed with many of the rights of citizenship.
Its permanence, its limited liability, and its flexibility of owner-
ship as well as some of its tax advantages have made the corpo-
ration a much greater power in the economy than the individual
entrepreneur or proprietor. As industrialization expanded, our
states gradually relaxed the formalities for creation of corpora-
tions so that by 1880 incorporation often no longer required a
special act of the legislature but had become in many states a
routine administrative procedure. Thereafter incorporators
could write their own charters pretty much to suit themselves.
The idea of forwarding a governmental purpose in the creation
of corporations became lost except for a relatively small num-
ber of those government and municipal corporations still
created by legislative act. Meanwhile the perpetuation of con-
centrated wealth in a family by trusts or by entail had been
made very difficult by statute both in England and here. Mod-
ern estate and inheritance taxes will ere long complete the job
of fragmenting family fortunes. The corporation meantime has
steadily grown in economic importance. Professor Mason in
The Corporation in Modern Society states:s
The five hundred largest business corporations in this
country embrace nearly two-thirds of all non-agricultural
6 See Lerwin, English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 UNIV. OF
CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 355 (1955).
7 Statute of Monopolies, (1624) in the reign of James I.
8 Edward S. Mason, Harvard University Press, 1959, 5.
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activity. These and similar figures are reiterated with such
frequency that they tend to bounce off our heads rather than
to penetrate. But by now we are all aware that we live not
only in a corporate society but a society of large corpora-
tions. The management, that is, the control, of these corpo-
rations is in the hands of, at most, a few thousand men. Who
selected these men, if not to rule over us, at least to exercise
a vast authority, and to whom are they responsible? The
answer to the first question is quite dear: they selected
themselves. The answer to the second is at best nebulous.
This, in a nutshell, constitutes the problem of legitimacy.
This language is also substantially true of national and in-
ternational labor unions, except that labor's controlling
hierarchy appears to be a smaller group, less inhibited by
public scrutiny. Abram Cheyes, former Professor of Law at
Harvard, lately counsel to the State Department, states in the
same text: "They (the big corporations) are repositories of
power, the biggest centers of non-governmental power in our
society."9 At the outset we noted a similar comment by Pro-
fessor Slichter about labor unions. Such views are the basis for
the doctrine of countervailing power which appears to dominate
our present thinking in economic policy. 1 o
The private corporation has gradually lost its original
sovereign flavor but the labor union, once simply an associa-
tion of artisans interested in maintaining the standards of skill
in a given trade, has developed steadily into an important
quasi-public institution. The reach of the private corporation,
no longer accorded rights other than those possessed by indi-
vidual citizens, can be delineated through the title to its prop-
erty and the scope of its contracts. The union is a more nebu-
lous entity and as a bargaining agent it acquires a distinct politi-
cal authority and responsibility such that its power extends be-
yond the reach of its property, its membership or the corpora-
tion or proprietorship in which the bargaining unit is located. 1
9 Id. at 25.
10 See J. K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM-THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952.
13 See particularly § 9, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159.
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The corporation, stemming from a royal institution, has
always been formally organized, owing specific responsibilities
to its creator, certain contractual obligations to its members,
and possessed of distinct internal structure. It has taken many
forms and been adapted to an extraordinary variety of common
endeavors, the primary classifications of which being profit
(stock), charity (non-stock), and municipal government. We
have in every state a comprehensive body of law as to the con-
duct of corporations, well-expounded in judicial interpretation.
Surprisingly, though corporations have long been the primary
instruments of interstate commerce, we have no general federal
corporation law. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Federal Trade Commission and other regulatory agencies
take an active role in special areas, as when corporate securities
are offered for public disposal, but the act of incorporation and
the direct control of corporate conduct remains a state function.
Labor unions are not required to incorporate although there
are various reasons advanced as to why it might be advisable to
require it, not the least of which would be to standardize and
simplify their legal treatment. Although a few unions have in-
corporated there are a few distinctions which in this country
make the union sui generis. The union in its present role bears
dose resemblance to an ancillary municipal corporation, such
as a transportation authority or a water district, in that it exer-
cises special authority of a nonvoluntary nature in a public
function extraneous to the conventional subdivisions of
government. Unions began simply as voluntary associations,
not recognized as entities at law. Resembling at this stage a
charitable group or fraternal lodge they were quite difficult to
pin down to a contractual responsibility. This uncertainty of
substance substantially explains the initial disinclination of
management to deal with them; you could make an agreement
with them but when you went to enforce it at law you found
yourself largely fanning the air. Responsibility was indistinct,
membership was transient and rarely was property attached.
There was seldom any effective legal action available to a party
aggrieved by a union other than to seek a preventive decree or
judicial injunction from a court in equity because an award of
damages usually proved uncollectible. Only individuals could
be sued at law, these had little property, and they could not be
jailed for debt. For union misdeeds the only practicable
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remedy was a court order which said in essence to this nebulous
group-"Don't do it again or we'll slap some bold fellow with
contempt of court."
With this elementary explanation of prestatute labor law
let us proceed to consider five major facets of union power from
the standpoint of statutes now governing industrial relations:
(a) What is the role of the unions in the macroeconomic
sphere? Why do they have special status in the maintenance of
the national economy? These questions are vitally important
because they furnish the raison d'etre of the original National
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act 12 and the Norris-LaGuardia
(Anti-Injunction) Act. s The authors of this legislation
reasoned that only by improved communications between
management and labor and by an improved distributing device
for the national income could economic peace and prosperity
be achieved. The union was imagined to be the perfect instru-
ment for these purposes. Therefore its growth became a pur-
pose of public policy high in priority.
(b) What is the position of the union in the microeconomic
sense? How does the union exercise power over the community
and vice versa? Here we encounter the effect of various im-
munities to conventional judicial procedure which, coupled
with the doctrine of federal preemption, leave our component
communities virtually powerless before an aggressive national
union.
(c) Although the political stigma affixed to corporate
wealth makes the average American apathetic to the tribula-
tions of employers, our study cannot ignore the legal position
of the harassed managements of industrial enterprise. Whether
or not we sympathize with the captains of industry, the fact re-
mains that the productivity of each worker depends in good
measure upon the efficiency of his management and the amount
of capital invested in the tools he uses. If the climate of the law
fails to encourage either, we shall find ourselves steadily losing
ground in world markets and in comparative economic strength.
12 See 49 Star. 449, Act of 5 July 1935, 29 U. S. C. § 151.
13 47 Star. 70, Act of 23 March 1932, 29 U. S. C. § 101-115.
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(d) What is the status of the union at law vis-a-vis the indi-
vidual worker? The federal government has come to consis-
tently ignore or preempt the prerogatives of the state and com-
munity governments. The hapless industrial property owners
have been chief quarry in a seeming endless game of hare and
hounds. Only the workers themselves appear to comprise a
sufficiently significant element of the electorate to ultimately
exercise corrective leverage on the federal political machinery.
Their legal status is therefore quite important to our analysis.
(e) A fifth aspect can be touched on only briefly herein.
This is the relationship of a local union with the national and
international goliaths, the community organization versus the
professionals who operate on a country-wide perspective. Were
the antitrust immunities of the unions to be modified this rela-
tionship might acquire great importance.
II
The macroeconomic role of unions developed from the
economic theory adopted by President Roosevelt in his first
administration. 13. It had as its original premise the necessity
for halting competition and ambitiously expanding the role of
the federal government. Senator Wagner in presenting the
National Labor Relations Act to the Senate on 1 March 1934
offered the following explanation: 14
The keynote of the recovery program is organization
and cooperation. Employers are allowed to unite in trade
associations in order to pool their information and experi-
ence and make a concerted drive upon the problems of
modern industrialism. If properly directed, this united
strength will result in unalloyed good to the nation. But it
is fraught with great danger to workers and consumers if it
is not counterbalanced by the equal organization and equal
bargaining power of employees. Such equality is the central
need of the economic world today. It is necessary to insure
a wise distribution of wealth between management and
13
a 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 536 (1957).
14 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, Volume I,
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1949, 15.
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labor, to maintain a full flow of purchasing power, and to
prevent recurrent depressions.
On May 27, 1935 the Supreme Court handed down the
memorable decision of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,' r holding that the federal regulation of local trade under
the National Industrial Recovery Act exceeded the delegated
powers of Congress and violated the Tenth Amendment. This
necessitated a reorientation of the justification for the measure
proposed since the powers assigned to the federally sponsored
trade association to which Wagner had referred were thereby
made unconstitutional. The modified justification, recited in
the Act itself, as approved in July 1935, declared: 16
The inequality of bargaining power between employees
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract and employers who are organized in cor-
porate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce and tends to
aggravate recurrent business depressions by depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in in-
dustry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage rates and working conditions within and between in-
dustries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively
safeguards commerce from injury, impairment or interrup-
tion and promotes the flow of commerce by removing
certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjust-
ment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours or other working conditions and by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees.
When the emergency had passed, a post-war Congress
added another paragraph under the above "Findings and
Policies" of the National Labor Relations Act which read as
follows: 17
15 295 U. S. 495.
16 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1935).
17 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
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Experience has further demonstrated that certain prac-
tices by some labor organizations, their officers and mem-
bers have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or
obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods
in such commerce through strikes and other forms of in-
dustrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair
the interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce.
The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition
to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
As Justice Holmes pithily observed, "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience."18 It was the happy
hope of the early depression Congresses that industrial strife
would cease to plague the freedom of commerce if only em-
ployers were thwarted from interfering with unionization of
their employees and were required to share control of their
enterprise with these unions through "collective bargaining."
The sponsors theorized that since this procedure would raise
wages and stimulate consumption it would thereby accelerate
growth of the overall economy, whereas otherwise the excess
profits of industry would merely be salted away in "unpro-
ductive" savings.
Unions are an essential feature of an industrial economy.
Their recognition as collective bargaining agents is a legal
necessity, but as our subsequent discourse will develop, laws
conferring exclusive privileges upon unions and segregating
the system of law in the field of industrial relations from the
basic judicial system of our federal society have overshot the
mark at which they were purportedly aimed, in spite of the
corrections attempted in more recent legislation.
In the meantime the federal government has undertaken
to stimulate the distribution of national income by important
other means. It has elaborately built a floor of fair labor stand-
ards and wages, 19 cushioned it with social security of steadily
increasing coverage and generosity, 20 sponsored comprehen-
18 Quoted in Livington Shirt Corporation Case, 107 NLRB No. 109 (1953)
and also in HENDRICKS, BULWARK OF THE REPUBLIC, Little Brown
& Company, Boston, 1937, 425.
'9 52 Stat. 1060, Act of 25 June 1938, 29 U. S. C. § 201-219.
20 Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 301.
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sive unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation
acts, 2 1 underwritten vast housing outlays and given away
mountains of comestibles to improve the lot of the low income
bracket in our economy. For almost thirty years the federal
legislative mills have steadily ground out welfare legislation
which has engulfed the originally conceived economic func-
tion of the unions. To this fact Sumner Slichter referred in his
sixth major union characteristic, their disregard of the in-
creasing importance of the government's role.
Following the departure of Franklin Roosevelt from the
national scene there came a reassessment of the basic policies of
the federal government. Some fundamental legislation bor-
dering on a constitutional nature was enacted in the early post-
war years; the Administrative Procedures Act2 2 and the Em-
ployment Act23 were especially noteworthy. In the area of
macro-economics perhaps the most significant statement of
policy is that set forth in the first section of the Employment
Act in 1946 which reads thus:
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy
and responsibility of the federal government to use all
practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations
and other essential considerations of national policy, the
assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor
and state and local governments, to coordinate and utilize
all its plans, functions and resources for the purpose of
creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster
and promote free competitive enterprise and general wel-
fare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful
employment opportunities, including self-employment,
for those able, willing and seeking to work, and to promote
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.
That long awkward sentence, obviously hammered out
painfully in legislative compromise, says a good deal and im-
plies a great deal more. It is the mark ofJohn Maynard Keynes
21 Employers Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60; Railroad Retirement Act 45
U. S. C. § 215; Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U. S. C. § 1400;
Unemployment Compensation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 501.
22 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
23 60 Stat. 23, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1021.
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on our faltering federalism. The federal government is de-
clared responsible for the concentration of all its vast powers
(1) upon the creation of conditions affording employment for
those desiring it and (2) upon the acceleration of the national
economy to the fullest extent practicable. Implicit is recogni-
tion that, rightly or wrongly, the federal government will be
held responsible for any economic decelerations. Implicit also
is recognition that the federally controlled section of the
economy had reached such mammoth proportions as to make
it essential that the exercise of this economic-flywheel function
be open, above-board and official. The knowing observer
could rightly reason that the necessary authority to discharge
such a vast responsibility would be assumed by future Con-
gresses, future administrations and future Courts, the basic
Constitutional concept of a limited federal government and of
latent reserved powers in the states to the contrary notwith-
standing.
It is worthy of note that in the whole Constitution the only
thread of connection between the economic responsibility set
forth in the Employment Act and the basic authority granted to
the federal government by the people of the States lies in that
heavily trafficked clause under Article I, section 8 assigning to
Congress power ". . . to regulate commerce with Foreign
nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
An aggressive expansion of the meaning of the power to
"regulate commerce.., among the several States" had been
undertaken by the judiciary since the start of Mr. Roosevelt's
second term after he broached his controversial plan to pack the
Supreme Court. Their historic change in position was spelled
out in 1937 in the Jones and Laughlin case 24 in which the
application of National Labor Relations Board authority to a
local employment controversy at a steel plant was upheld on
the rationale that its production "affected" commerce and
therefore was intended to be covered in the constitutiona
24 See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1 (1937). This
opinion by Chief Justice Hughes reversed 3 cases from different U. S. Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal, challenging the powers of NLRB, each of which had
come unanimously to an opposite conclusion. Perhaps no event since the
Civil War has had greater long term impact on the subsequent political
character of the United States.
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grant of implementing power to Congress. This 5 to 4 decision
substantially annulled the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and
opened the legislative floodgates for the establishment of the
welfare state.
The only real bounds of federal authority today in the eco-
nomic field appear to lie in the inclination of the Congress
framing the statute and in the zeal of the respective regulatory
body for handling the workload entailed. To illustrate, the
courts have declared the following workers to be encom-
passed by the federal power over interstate commerce: window-
washers contracting to wash windows in an office building
whose tenants do some interstate business,2 S employees of an
ice plant whose customers occasionally carry ice out of the
state,2 6 workers on an irrigation ditch the water from which
waters fields in which produce is raised to be sold out of state,27
and office workers in a news service which collects news from
out of state and distributes it locally. 2s The National Labor
Relations Board is empowered to write its own ticket to the
limits of federal jurisdiction in this field. 2 9
Although the student may marvel that a responsibility such
as that of the Employment Act, with all its pervasive attendant
authority, could have been assumed without contemplation of
any Constitutional Amendment, he should appreciate the fact
that by 1946 the Congress, acting expost facto, was conscienti-
ously trying to spell out a restraint rather than an extension of
federal responsibility, as is revealed in the Senate-House con-
ference report with which the Act was finally presented: 3 0
The Senate declared that it is the responsibility of the
federal government to maintain full employment and to
assure at all times sufficient opportunities for employment
to enable all Americans able and willing to work to exercise
their right to continued full employment.
25 328 U. S. 108 (1945) and 156 F. 2d. 958 (2d Cit. 1946).
2 6 Southern United Ice Company v. Hendrix, 153 F. 2d. 689 (6th Cir. 1946).
27 Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U. S. 755 (1948).
2 8 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States 342, U. S. 222 (1951).
29 See Sec. 14(c) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 164(c).
80 U. S. Code Congressional Service, 79th Congress 2d. Session 1946, 1068.
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The House substitute declared it is the continuing
policy of the United States to promote employment, pro-
duction and purchasing power under the system of free
competitive enterprise and that the function of the govern-
ment is to promote and not to assure or guarantee employment.
It is the theory of the House substitute that employment is
not the sole responsibility of the government and that in-
dustry, agriculture and labor have their responsibility...
The term 'full employment' is rejected and maximum em-
ployment is the objective to be promoted... The United
States is to promote by all practicable means which may well
include, but need not be limited to taxation, banking, credit
and currency, foreign trade, public works, loans. Studies
are to be made and causes of economic dislocations accer-
tained. Causes of unemployment are to be removed or
eliminated. The goal is maximum or high levels of em-
ployment; the emphasis on spending, expenditures and
disbursements is omitted from the conference agreement.
Our traumatic experience in the Great Depression has been
popularly attributed to a maldistribution of national income
caused by an increasingly unbalanced concentration of eco-
nomic power in big corporations. The cure prescribed was a
cartelization of labor, industry and agriculture followed by a
grand scale collaboration with government to conduct a sub-
stantially planned economy. A generation of consolidation
followed, after which gnawing doubts began to stir a deep con-
cern as to the wisdom of encouraging such unwieldly concentra-
tions of economic power. Meanwhile unintelligibly complex
codes of regulatory law and interpretations have grown tier on
tier acquiring a defense in depth almost beyond penetration
short of revolution. Behind not the least of these citadels of
verbosity stands the nationwide combine of organized labor.
The most significant attack on the status quo of union power
comes now from the same academic quarter which thirty years
ago insisted that the unions be put on the macroeconomic map
in large letters. Economists now perceive an unbalance oppo-
site to that which then tilted the economy heavily to one side. 31
31 See generally: ST ICHTER, HEALY AND LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT, Brookings In-
stitute, Washington, 1961, and BRADLEY, THE PUBLIC STAKE IN
UNION POWER, University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 1959.
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The broad immunity so long extended to unions from re-
straints applicable to the other elements of our society has per-
mitted and encouraged such a strong concentration and deep
entrenchment of their collective power that they may ulti-
mately prove more difficult to dislodge from political domin-
ance than any prior vested interests. The unions' base is broader,
their source of wealth more secure, their organization more
compact, and their opposition more completely cowed.32
Let us therefore examine some of the unique union privi-
leges and immunities which have made their economic power
inaccessible to the normal processes of the law. In a practical
sense what was accomplished by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
by the Wagner Act?
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 rigidly constrained the
authority of the federal judiciary in labor disputes. The use of
one of the basic tools of equity, the injunction, by the federal
judiciary against union activity of any sort was almost wholly
outlawed. A "labor dispute" was officially defined in the Act so
broadly that union organizers actually representing no one in
an industrial community, could, without any local occasion,
instigate picketing under the protection of the act, and be held
blameless for any resultant concerted violence or economic
damage. 33 Thus the stranger picket and the secondary boycott
were made inviolate in any industry with a scintilla of interstate
activity. Neither the strike nor the boycott needed to involve
any local employees or issues. National or International unions
accordingly could project their activities nationally without
need of reasonably persuading a significant number of em-
ployees to join or finding any conflict between labor and
management in a given bargaining unit. The tools of coercion
were theirs and they were extensively used.a 33
Beyond this roving commission for the national organiza-
tions the Wagner Act of 1935 spelled out a stringent list of
32 See SYLVESTER PETRO, POWER UNLIMITED, Ronald Press Company,
New York, 1959.
33 Sec. 13 of Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113 and United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1940).
33
aThe classic example of this is the Apex Hosiery Case, Apex Hosiery v.
Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (1940); see also NLRB v. International Rice Mill-
ing, 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
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prohibitions on employers. 34 The enforcement of these privi-
leges and restrictions was assigned to a new administrative
agency, the National Labor Relations Board which had two
primary functions, one administrative, one judicial. To quickly
develop labor's leverage on the economy, the Board administra-
tively determined which union was to be the collective bar-
gaining agent for what industrial bargaining units. 3 5 The inde-
pendent or community union became branded as the tool of
employers and effectively removed from the industrial scene. 3 6
The Board, thereupon assumed, under the Act, the combined
roles of complainant, judge, jury and prosecutor to determine
whether any violations of the code had been committed and
how to punish the recalcitrant employer.7 If an "unfair labor
practice" were found to have been committed by the employer
the Board was authorized to issue an order comparable to a
court decree directing such corrective action as it saw fit. The
original itemization of unfair labor practices by the employer
included: 3 8
(1) direct or indirect interference with employees' right to
organize or to conduct, for mutual aid, any concerted activities
(strikes, boycotts, slowdowns, picketing, meetings, proselyt-
ing, etc.,),
(2) showing any approval or disapproval of any employee
organization or assisting one union against another in any way,
(3) showing any bias relative to union status in treatment
of prospective or actual employees,
(4) penalizing any employee for invoking Board action,
(5) refusing to "bargain" with a union about any condi-
tion of employment-this perhaps the most dangerous clause
of all and highly controversial, is now broadly interpreted to
34 Sec. 8(a) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158.
35 Id. § 159.
36 See S. REP. NO. 105, 80th Congress, 1st Sess. 12-13 (1947) and Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72 (1940).
37 §§ 10 and 11, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 160, 161.
38 Sec. 8(a) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158.
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outlaw any unilateral action by an employer even in the im-
provement of his production facilities or the subcontracting of
work which can be more efficiently done elsewhere.
By the express language of the Act the "bargaining agent"
is bequeathed exclusive monopoly power in dealing with the
employer.39 It is virtually a criminal act for an employer to
take any action affecting working conditions, wages, hours,
shifts, or staffing without prior consultation with the union. 39
Only the agent union may speak for employees in the bar-
gaining unit, regardless of their membership or non-member-
ship in the union.39b If the union calls a strike because of an
unfair labor practice, such as the employer's refusal to bargain
over what the management might erroneously consider its own
prerogatives, e.g., the installation of labor saving devices, not
only is the union freed of any responsibility under a no-strike
contract clause but the employer must keep the strikers on his
payroll. 3o The "right to strike" though ill-defined, is taken to
mean not simply the right to quit work in unison, but the
right to stop others from working, to peacefully picket all the
employer's operations and to retain a vested interest in the jobs
abandoned as well. 3 9d An individual who quits his job because
he believes his employer to be treating him unfairly has no such
vested right. With rare exceptions only a union may exercise it
since what is protected is "concerted" action. Therefore the
employee has job security only by remaining in the good
graces of the union. The union's exclusive privilege in achieving
job security is of inestimable value in maintaining union dis-
cipline and in exercising economic leverage on a national scale
over both the employer, who may lose heavily in a work stop-
page while the union leadership actually has very little to lose,
and over the employee, whose rights are derived through the
union. The privilege applies not only to the strike but to any
"concerted activity" decided upon by the union leadership,
39 Id. Sec. 159.
39aNLRB v. J. H. Allison Company, 165 F.2d. 766 (6th Cir. 1948).
39b Matter of National Tube, 76 NLRB 1199 (1948).
3 9c See NLRB v. Lion Oil Company, 352 U. S. 282 (1957).
N9dNLRB v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics, 228F.2d. 553
(2d Cir. 1955).
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such as a refusal to handle certain work, to work at certain
hours, or on certain days, to permit any changes in "work
rules," to allow introduction of labor-saving devices, to permit
relocation of operations, and similar tactics which help to con-
solidate the existing membership.
By contrast in our wonderland of industrial relations the
government's policy is "do as I say, not as I do." The following
clause of the Labor Management Relations Act abruptly fore-
doses for millions of civil service personnel the conventional
"right to strike." 40
It shall be unlawful for any individual employed by the
United States, or any agency thereof including wholly
owned Government Corporations to participate in any
strike. Any individual employed by the United States or by
any such agency who strikes shall be immediately dis-
charged from his employment and shall forfeit his civil
service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for reemploy-
ment for three years by the United States or any such
agency.
In the civilian economy, in economic strikes, e.g., for
higher wages or fringe benefits, as distinguished from "unfair
labor practice" strikes, retroactive pay rights are not protected
by law but reinstatement rights are. 4 1 The economic strike
becomes ineffective, therefore, if replacements can be hired on
the open market, unless an unfair labor practice can be con-
veniently employed as an occasion to gain economic benefits or,
by the coercion of concerted discipline, the union is able to
economically excommunicate the employer's whole operation.
To bring pressure to raise wages or shorten hours or block dis-
continuance of jobs the union must depend on its comprehen-
sive discipline. It should be dear then that the macroeconomic
role of the union in our planned economy is to serve as an
instrument through which there can be maintained sufficient
discipline in the working forces throughout the whole industrial
complex to enable them to extract their optimum share of the
Gross National Product.
40 61 Stat. 136. See particularly Sec. 305 of statute, 129 U. S. C. § 141-197.
41 NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d. 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
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The popular assumption has been that the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act42 of 1959 corrected the
distorted features of the Wagner Act of 1935. Amendments
were made which were helpful in restoring confidence to in-
dustry but the fundamental privileges and immunities of or-
ganized labor actually were preserved in toto. The Taft-
Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act 4 a attempted to spell
out a parallel list of unfair practices on the part of labor to
balance those previously specified for management. Piecemeal
amendment has proven ineffectual in many ways however, and
judicial interpretation has substantially vitiated much of what
Senator Taft sought to achieve in his legislation. The feather-
bedding and secondary boycott provisions are illustrative of
the gap between theory and practice.4 a Minor modifications
in union technique permit easy evasion of the intent of the law.
The provisions for judicial review of the activity of the National
Labor Relations Board44 still leaves the courts substantially
preempted of original jurisdiction. Union responsibility unde-
niably has been greatly enhanced by the legal entity concept 44a
under which they may sue and be sued for breach of contract
but the finding of the Supreme Court that courts lack cogni-
zance of arbitration proceedings has furnished an effective
escape from this clause.44b
The effect of the Taft-Hartley has been to strengthen the
status quo; new unions are harder to organize, but the estab-
lished unions are more firmly established. Labor discipline has
become tighter in the already highly concentrated industrial
power centers, because, due to the seniority rules in nearly all
contracts, entrenchment gets steadily deeper until, as in the
railroads only old age can reduce the rolls. The extensive
42 73 stat. 519.
43 These clauses although enacted in Taft-Hartley are in the form of amend-
ments to the Wagner Act and are found now as parts of 8(b) therein.
4 3
a See 39(d) above and 10 Labor Law Journal 175 (1959) as to boycotts; as
to featherbedding 345 U. S. 100 & 345 U. S. 117 (1953); the make-work
problem under the Railway Labor Act is even more troublesome.
44 Sec. 10(f) National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(f).
4 4
a § 301 Labor-Management Relations Act.
44b 363 U. S. 593 (1960) also see Paul R. Hays, Supreme Court and Labor
Law, October Term 1959, 60 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 901, 919-935
particularly.
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government machinery for arbitration, mediation and concilia-
tion established in the Taft-Hartley Act 4 5 has reduced the fre-
quency of work stoppages by facilitating adjudication of con-
tract interpretation disputes, but the trend toward nationally
centralized control of contract terms continues unabated. The
prestige of national unions is closely tied to the size and con-
sistency of their contract gains. The provisions for handling
national emergency industrial disputes by an eighty day
"cooling off" period46 is a weak substitute for injunctive
process against interference with individual freedom of choice.
So long as our basic law tends to encourage tightly organized
international and national unions with protected interests in
abandoned jobs, there will be industrywide bargaining or fol-
low-the-leader bargaining. We shall be confronted with a most
dangerous situation as long as a small handful of labor leaders
are privileged to throw the country into economic paralysis.
This is not a necessary adjunct to unionization. 46a
To summarize the present legal status of unions in the
national economy, they have been furnished the exclusive pre-
rogatives to maintain very effective discipline not merely within
their own ranks but throughout our industrial complex. This
discipline is conducive to national rather than local organiza-
tion. Immunity to laws against the restraint of trade and to
conventional equity jurisdiction together with their special
"bargaining agent" monopoly give the national union the
tools to maintain tight discipline which in turn wields tre-
mendous economic power.
III
Let us change our focus of interest from the area of macro-
economics, the national economic entity, to microeconomic
area, the individual firm, community or innocent bystander.
The classic statement of current policy was set forth in the case
45 § 202 Labor Management Relations Act establishes the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service.
46 Id. at §§ 206-210.
4 6
aU. S. CONST. art. I, § 10 forbids any state from entering into an alliance
or confederation. Sherman and Clayton Acts control corporate combina-
tions. That we should countenance in labor what neither government nor
industry is permitted speaks more clearly than words the power of unions.
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of Garner v. Teamsters Union in 195 3.4 7 Here a small trucking
firm in Pennsylvania had been subjected to a typical teamster
"stranger" strike. There was no labor dispute between the firm
and its twenty-four employees of whom only four were union
members. The firm handled local intrastate deliveries and
pickups for a railroad. Mr. Beck's international organization
sought designation as "bargaining agent." It sent outsiders to
picket all operations of the trucker. The trucker's business fell
off 95% because no other drivers would cross the picket lines.
The trucker, his business ruined, asked for an equitable in-
junction in the Pennsylvania state courts to halt the picketing
since there was no majority of union men in his own organiza-
tion and no dispute with his own employees. The lower court
granted the injunction to thwart an obvious unfair labor
practice. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the in-
junction exceeded the State's powers. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court on the constitutional principle that
private rights were enforceable at state law. Mr. Justice
Jackson writing the affirming opinion said:4 7a
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of
law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply the
law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary
interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and
specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular
procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and
hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending final
administrative order. Congress evidently considered that
centralized administration of specially designed pro-
cedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and con-
flicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies ... This case would
warrant little further discussion except for a persuasively
presented argument that the National Labor Relations
Board enforces only a public right on behalf of the public
interest while state equity powers are invoked by a private
party to protect a private right... We conclude that when
federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protection
47346 U. S. 485 (1953).
47aid. at 490.
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of public or private interests, or both it becomes the su-
preme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented
or extended by a state procedure merely because it will
apply some doctrine of private right. To the extent that the
private right is in conflict with the public one the former is
superceded . . . Of course Congress in enacting such legis-
lation as we have here, can save alternative or supplemental
state remedies by express terms or by some dear implication
if it sees fit.
We cannot but wonder what might have been conceived to
be the meaning of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the
Constitution which read, "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people." and, "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor pro-
hibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively
or to the people." Presumably the Court concedes that Con-
gress in its wisdom may place centralized economic control
higher in our scale of values than abstract personal or com-
munity rights.
In 1895 when Eugene Victor Debs was challenging the
authority of the courts to hold him for contemp in the con-
tinued violence of the Pullman Strike, Justice Brewer in ex-
plaining the authority exercised said: 48
It is curious to note the fact that in a large proportion of
the cases in respect to interstate commerce brought to this
court, the question presented was of the validity of state
legislation in its bearing upon interstate commerce. If a
State with its recognized powers of sovereignty is impotent
to obstruct interstate commerce can it be that any mere
voluntary association of individuals within the limits of
that State has a power which the State itself does not
possess?
Today the answet to Justice Brewer's question is not as
obvious as at the turn of the century. Confronted with chal-
lenging problems in industrial relations the injured party ap-
pears to have no alternatives under the present laws other than
48 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
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acceding to the union demands or passing the responsibility to
the executive branch of the Federal Government. Celebrated
recent episodes include the steel strike two years ago, the tug-
boat strike in New York harbor in January 1961 and the tie up
of air traffic a month later. The final settlement in the 1959
industry-wide steel dispute was arranged only after the per-
sonal intervention of Vice President Nixon. Furious legal
battles had ended in the application of the Taf-Hartley in-
junction after collective bargaining had proceeded fruitlessly
for several months. In the settlement wages gained another
lap on productivity. The price-profits squeeze became more
intense. Markets for structural materials, lost to other pro-
ducers, stayed lost, and the foreign trade balance remained
badly distorted. One year later the tugboat crew dispute 4 0,
involving merely sixty-two jobs, forced President Kennedy to
dispatch his Labor Secretary straight from the Inaugural to
devise a deferral of the crucial featherbedding issue; 100,000
commuters to Manhattan had been stranded for a week and the
strike, coupled with blizzards, had threatened the great metrop-
olis with gradual starvation. Trains were halted from Cleveland
to Providence. Less than a month later all civilian air traffic was
shut down and 80,000 employees idled by a wildcat walkout of
highly paid flight personnel in a jurisdictional dispute.5o
Again the President found it necessary to intercede and defer
the issue by appointing a special ad hoc conciliatory body. , 1
The dilemma has been created by excluding labor issues from
federal courts on the grounds they are not commerce and from
state courts on the ground of federal preemption under the
National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act,51"
which are predicated on the conduct of commerce!
State "right to work" laws and State Court authority to
award tort damages in certain labor cases or injunctions in
certain obvious cases of impending or continuing violence are
49 For a thrilling blow-by-blow account of this comic-opera type affair involving
the employment of one extra deckhand on each of nine ferry boats and
fifty-one tugboats, see front page of the New York Times, January 20 to
January 31, 1961.
50 See News items in the New York Times, February 18, 1961, 1, col. 1.
51 Id. February 24, 1961, 1, col. 8.
5 1
a Sec. 6 Clayton Act, 29 U. S. C. § 17.
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at best peripheral influences in the industrial relations field. . 2
The Sovereign constitutional authority of the State and of its
component communities to act in either their own public
interest, or on the behalf of injured citizens whose personal
rights have been transgressed, has been so frequently counter-
manded in the field of labor disputes that that main element of
order, prestige and sovereign dignity, has been effectively
destroyed. Few intelligent persons will waste time attempting
to get a local remedy when the odds clearly indicate the
remedy will be overruled by exercise of the doctrine of federal
preemption.52a Thus in the microeconomic sense there is
little a community can do in self-defense. Union power is of a
larger order than state sovereignty.
IV
As to the capacity of employers to exercise effective bar-
gaining power in their relations with union organizations under
the present legal ground rules the following extract from a
report of the Senate (McClellan) Subcommittee on Labor
Management Relations speaks for itself: 53
When it comes to immunities, business enterprises en-
joy none while labor unions enjoy many. The latter are
immune from the Federal income tax and similar taxes in a
number of the States. Only employerspay theunemployment
compensation tax, the railroad unemployment insurance
tax, and the payments required under workmen's compen-
sation laws by both Federal and State Governments.
Unions are not subject to the Federal antitrust laws and
have substantial immunity from the granting of injunctions
against them by the Federal courts under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and in some States which have little Norris-
LaGuardia Acts.
Among the additional privileges and immunities en-
joyed by labor unions are the following:
52 See Arnold Schlossberg, Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 42 VA. L.
REV. 691, particularly 701 (1956).
5 2
a Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340
U. S. 383 (1958); see generally ALBION TAYLOR, LABOR AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 2nd ed., Brown Brumfield, Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan, 1961, 167-185.
53 Legislative History of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, Vol. I Office of General Counsel, NLRB, 511-512.
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(1) The Federal Government in the Taft-Hartley Act spe-
cifically guarantees them against interference with their
internal affairs, nor are they required to be incorporated
under either State or Federal law. Corporations on the
other hand owe their existence to State corporation law and
their activities are limited to the provisions of their corpo-
rate charters which are required to be in conformity with
State Law.
(2) Labor unions have immunity against the misconduct
of their members who are engaged in union activity as, for
example, strikes and picketing. This kind of immunity is
not possessed by other types of unincorporated associa-
tions.
(3) Labor unions enjoy the right to bargain exclusively for
all the employees in the unit, including those employees
who are strongly opposed to the union. This can mean, as
it often does, that a union selected as the bargaining agent
by as few as twenty-five percent of the employees in the
unit becomes the bargaining spokesman for all the em-
ployees.
(4) Labor unions are not subject to anything similar or
equivalent to suits by minority corporate stockholders
against their corporations.
(5) Through collective bargaining contracts labor unions
may require union membership as a condition of continued
employment although employers are forbidden by law to
require nonmembership in a union as a condition of em-
ployment.
(6) Unions enjoy a right to strike without either the union
or its members being penalized therefor. If the strike re-
sults from the employer's unfair labor practice, the strikers
cannot be replaced. The employer does not have any equiv-
alent right to engage in a lockout, except in two types of
situations, both extremely rare and both of minor signifi-
cance. All other types of lockout are illegal under the Taft-
Hartley Act.
(7) The prohibition imposed on unions by the Taft-
Hartley Act against restraint and coercion of employees is
limited to physical violence, direct economic coercion or to
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threats of either of these two types of conduct. On the
other hand, the prohibition imposed on employers under
the act is against interference as well as restraint and co-
ercion which is forbidden to unions.
(8) When management discriminates against an em-
ployee in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board
may issue not only a cease-and-desist order but may re-
quire the employer to reinstate such employee and to pay
him backpay as well. These remedies are in substance
sufficient to take care of most of the unfair labor practices
committed by employers and to restore employees to the
status they would have enjoyed if the unfair labor practices
had not been committed. Unions, on the other hand, even
though they may engage in illegal conduct which results in
loss of pay for employees, are not required to compensate
employees for such loss, except where the union itself was
responsible for causing an employer to discriminate. Thus
an illegal mass picket line where picketing denies access to
the plant to employees who wish to continue to work and
which as a result causes such employees to lose pay is not
the type of misconduct which the NRLB has required the
offending union to remedy by compensating the employees
for loss of such pay, but an employer must compensate for
loss of pay suffered by locked-out employees.
(9) Unions have the right under certain circumstances to
examine an employer's books and records in the course of
collective bargaining. The employer has no equivalent
right.
(10) Labor unions in many situations have a legal right of
access to the employer's property, the right to compel the
employer to make his property available for use by the
union, and the right to invade the privacy of employees who
are not union members and sometimes even against their
wishes. Employers enjoy no equivalent or similar rights.
If the public is relying on corporate management to balance
union power, it is relying on a badly handicapped champion.
Those who wonder what became of the "equal protection"
clause in the Constitution must remember that it occurs in the
Fourteenth Amendment which applies to the States and not to
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the federal government. The more uncharitable might say it
was passed to humiliate the South and should not be taken out
of context.
V
We come now to an area in which legal relationships begin
to become quite tenuous. This is the area of intra-union and
inter-union affairs. It has already been indicated that the union
as an entity is much less distinct than the corporation. The
union may officially act for many employees who are not mem-
bers and it may have many members who are not employees of
the bargaining units for which it is the official agent. In theory
it is a voluntary non-profit unincorporated association and
historically it has had great privacy, flexibility and diversity
internally. As anyone with any experience in purely voluntary
organizations is keenly aware, their records, their financial
dealings, their adherence to any purportedly authentic by-laws
or constitution leaves much to be desired. Members not part
of the controlling group are usually powerless to make their
opinions or interests felt in the administrative procedure, par-
ticularly if strong-willed or unscrupulous persons have acquired
office. It is only natural if members and non-members are both
represented by a bargaining agent that the non-members will
suffer a comparative disadvantage. Further as Bertrand Russell
has pointed out 5 4 "Love of power is very unevenly distributed.
Those who most desire power are the most likely to acquire it.
In a social system in which power is open to all, posts which
confer power will be occupied by men who differ from the
average in being exceptionally power loving." Human inertia
makes unions undemocratic.
Understandably the governments both federal and state
have been exceeding hesitant to project themselves into internal
affairs of unions or any other voluntary associations. A con-
cept of "freedom of association" has been virtually annexed to
our Bill of Rights. r 5 The First Amendment declares the "right
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." The Railway Labor Act
54 POWER, W. W. Norton Company, New York, 1938, 14-15.
55 See U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876) and Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
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states among its purposes the intent "to provide for the com-
plete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter
of self organization." 56 The Norris-LaGuardia Act declares in
its statement of the public policy of the United States"...
though (the individual unorganized worker) should be free to
decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have
full freedom of association, self organization and designation
of representatives of his own choosing, and that he shall be
free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of
labor. .. "57 The National Labor Relations Act declares
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other
concerted activity... for mutual aid or protection." 58
Clearly at the onset of modern labor legislation there was an
intent simply to aquate the employees' freedom of action in the
forming of associations with the freedom of action of their
already highly organized employers. Actually, the employers
through the state corporation laws and through special federal
regulatory legislation were already extensively regulated as to
the form of their internal organization. Though the regulation
of business enterprise has grown since by leaps and bounds, the
first hesitant steps toward regulation of the internal affairs of
labor by the Federal government were taken in the Labor-
Management Disclosure and Reporting (Landrum-Griffin)
Act of 1959.
The events leading to the passage of this Act were authori-
tatively summarized in the Final Report of the Select Commit-
tee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
U. S. Senate 1960, popularly known as the report of the
McClellan Committee. The activities of this committee were a
springboard for several important statesmen, including Senator
John Fitzgerald Kennedy, his brother Chief Counsel Robert F.
Kennedy, and Senator Barry Goldwater. The disclosures of
the Committee centered around corruption in labor's official-
dom, particularly the underworld typified at the infamous
Appalachin conference muscling into legitimate business in
56 45 U. S. C. § 153.
57 29 U. S. C. § 102.
58 Id. § 157.
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the guise of organized labor; the collusion and bribery by which
employers and labor officials exploited workers notably in the
Chicago area; the coercive activities of the Teamsters Union to
destroy small enterprises, envelop unwilling employees, and
misuse the vast financial resources of the unions and the large
scale employment of coercion, open and covert, by the United
Auto Workers in the Kohler strike in Wisconsin and in the
Perfect Circle strike in Indiana.
The resultant legislation was a compromise which neither of
the major protagonists, the labor and management lobbies,
were happy about. Primarily the enactment sought to ensure a
modicum of democracy in the unions. The method of ac-
complishing this objective was to promulgate for every union
which sought, directly or indirectly, to function as a bargaining
agent under the National Labor Relations Act a set of minimum
requirements as to: (a) the rights of its members to express
ideas at variance with those of the union hierarchy; ,9 (b) the
reasonable control and publication of financial decisions and
dealings of union officials; 60 (c) the conduct and frequency of
elections;61 (d) the private enforcement of members' rights
in federal and state courts; 62  (e) the limitations of the
trusteeship concept whereby national unions arbitrarily exercise
control of the funds, voting power and operations of local
unions;63 (f) the screening and bonding of union officials
with fiduciary responsibilities;64 (g) the more specific pro-
hibition of collusive practices between dishonest employers and
labor officials; 65 (h) and by means of amendments to earlier
legislation the distinct assurance that some judicial or quasi-
judicial forum would be authorized to accept jurisdiction of
each labor dispute. 66
5973 Star. 519, § 101 (a) (1) and (2).
60 Id. § 201.
61 Id. § 401.
621d §§ 102 and 103.
63 Id. §§ 301-305.
64 Id. §§ 501-504.
65 Id. §§ 202 and 203, and § 302 Labor Management Relations Act.
66 § 14(c) (1) and (2), National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 164(c)
(1) and (2).
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This legislation has not as yet been sufficiently digested by
the judicial system to appraise its effectiveness. It marks a
distinct retreat from the blanket immunity which unions en-
joyed from internal regulation and the injunctive process. The
authority of state courts as well as of federal courts is partially
reasserted.6 7 The administration of protective ground rules
similar to those which states employ in regulating the internal
affairs of corporations has been allocated to the Federal De-
partment of Labor for all formally constituted labor organiza-
tions.68 Many aspects of the law appear to require further
clarification and particularization but the primary theme ap-
pears to be further preemption by the federal government and
greater centralization of authority, particularly in the Secretary
of Labor, now an immensely powerful post.
VI
From this analysis of the legal status of union power, suc-
cessively from the aspects of macroeconomics and microeco-
nomics, from the viewpoint of the management and of the wage
earner it should be evident that although the climate of the laws
of employment has varied considerably over the last thirty
years, the basic pattern has remained the same. The inviting
mirage of countervailing economic power led us on and on into
centralization of labor, of industry and of government. But
centralization has brought its own fearsome train of undesired
side-effects. Democracy is no more sure in a national union
than in a huge corporation. Government is not more benign
because it is larger. Freedom in the sense of diversity of choice
of employment for the worker and of economic alternatives
for management has become substantially less. For the lobby-
ists and the propagandists the task has been made much sim-
pler, for the responsibilities have been transferred to fewer and
more pliable hands, further removed from public view. The
relationship of cause and effect, and of incentive and impetus
has been increasingly beclouded. In a figurative sense the em-
brace of our society by the long arms of George Orwell's Big
Brother has become a tight bear hug., 9
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FOUNDATIONS OF UNION POWER
Economics is the science of allocation of goods and re-
sources to meet the requirements of a given society or economic
unit. The economy of our society is necessarily based on free
enterprise rather than state socialism, because the principles of
free enterprise are intimately interwoven with the concept of
political liberty. The free market is one which anyone so
desiring is at liberty to enter as a buyer or a seller, be it services
or commodities. Such a market must be governed by the
natural laws of economics rather than the artificial restraints of
politics. But the pretense of open competition is patently
false when the allocation of the most vital element in the
economy, employment or labor, depending on your perspec-
tive, is largely controlled by a privileged monopoly or cartel.
With competition hobbled it becomes impossible to achieve a
satisfactory allocation of goods and resources unless there is
put into effect some comprehensive plan of arbitrary distribu-
tion, the political routine of ever greater taxing and spending,
which becomes finally expropriation and redistribution. Wit-
tingly or unwittingly the sector of our national economy
governed by arbitrary political expropriation and redistribution
is now steadily eclipsing the once open market governed by
competitive principles.
Our post-war administrations have been forced to accelerate
the pace of expansion of govenmental responsibility at the
federal level because of the severe artificial restrictions in the
mobility of labor and in the freedom of action allowed em-
ployers under our employment statutes. The net effect of our
labor monopolies is that workers are unable to move freely into
the highly compensated fields where demand exceeds supply
and industry has been increasingly inhibited from moving into
areas where labor is in ample supply and living costs are low.
To illustrate, if carpenters and pipefitters were paid up to
$600 per week at missile sites it was because of the throttle-hold
of union monopoly on such services. Thousands of patriotic
workers, ready, willing and able to furnish equivalent services
for more reasonable wages obviously were artificially restricted
from competing. Meantime the Federal government as custo-
mer, made the sky the limit by giving carte blanche to con-
tractors to pay, on a cost reembursement basis, whatever was
necessary to get the job done under such handicaps.
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We can no more blame the unions for getting the best they
can for their members than we can blame the auctioneer who
gets the best price he can for his seller and so sells to the highest
bidder. We can only blame ourselves for our negligence in
letting the market be so easily rigged against the public interest.
As they say in the Law, he who sleeps on his rights has no com-
plaint. The logical economic correction is to rescind the special
privileges of the monopolists, but the probable political cor-
rection will be another commission, division or bureau which
will employ an assorted collection of experts in labor relations,
statistics, economics, data processing, program planning, etc.
These honorable servants will make a whale of a project out of
their undertaking. Later, as the dust of confusion rises and as
the access to the elementary facts becomes utterly impenetrable,
some practical determinations will be made and a compromise
will be reached whereby a basic wage of $450 a week will be
established plus $150 in fringe benefits. In return the union
hierarchy will probably agree not to publicly oppose the ad-
ministration's program. Such is the standard operating pro-
cedure for any good self-maintaining bureaucracy. The easy
answer is simply to leave things as they are so long as an elec-
torate comprised of the progeny of Barnum's customers are
gullible enough to keep on paying the bills.
